CFAVs roles, responsibilities, & training: is it time to address "role creep" in the ATC?

Adult Staff Execs
1

This topic is going to be controversial, and should hopefully stimulate some useful debate and discussion. This is a topic which I have been discussing with many in my Wing due to my role.

My fundamental question is this; “Is role creep an issue for CFAVs in the ATC, and are our roles and responsibilities clear?” I would argue “Yes” to the first part, and “No” to the second. Allow me to explain, as I believe there are several factors at work:

  1. It used to be the case (10-15 years ago) that the only thing you could not do as an AWO was be in command of a Sqn. That was the job an Officer, and thus there was an incentive for an individual to commission, if they wanted a command.

  2. The LASER review - implemented in 2003 - (a) created SNCOs(ATC), and (b) promised to - as a result - more clearly define the role and responsibilities of a WO(ATC); coupled with a concurrent adjustment of establishments. There was talk of WOs only being appointed to fulfil specific roles, and their having specific responsibilities (i.e. Sector, Wing, & Regional WOs), commanding specific TORs. This promised clarity (and associated WO course at ATF) never materialised, and thus we still have - 11 years after the implementation of LASER - SNCOs being promoted effectively on time served, and - arguably - many more WOs than were originally envisaged/intended …such that their role is no longer that which was intended by LASER.

  3. Since WOs/SNCOs(ATC) can now command a Sqn, what is it that Officers should be doing, that WOs/SNCOs can not?

  4. Since we have (and always have had) CIs in the ATC, and there is very little that CIs cannot do - functionally - within the Corps, e.g. they can teach, they can become AT instructors, they can become SAAIs, they can become gliding instructors, etc. We often hear that there are not enough uniformed staff in the Corps, but when CIs can “do everything” (other than be in command of a unit), where is the incentive - other than the desire for command - for individuals to go into uniform, either as an SNCO or Officer?

Moving on - is there enough clarity over roles and their associated responsibilities? I would suggest that - fundamentally - there are two types of roles to consider:

  • Functional Roles, i.e. CI, SNCO, WO, Officer - these have associated responsibilities (e.g. instruction for CIs; instruction, dress, drill, and discipline for SNCOs; and management for WOs and Offrs)
  • Executive Roles, i.e. Sqn Cdr, Adj, Trg Off, WSO, Sector WO, WWO, etc.

Hold that thought - we’ll come back to it.

Comparing the ATC to, for example, the ACF - they have a very different arrangement in terms of the roles and responsibilities of their CFAVs:

  1. The ACF do not have CIs, they have Civilian Assistants (CAs). CAs do not (and cannot) instruct cadets in any aspect of the Army Proficiency Certificate (APC) syllabus, they help with admin and other support duties.

  2. To instruct cadets, CAs have to become an Adult Instructor (AI). ACF AIs are SNCOs & WOs - either a Probationary Instructor (PI), Sergeant Instructor (SI), Staff Sergeant Instructor (SSI), Sergeant Major Instructor (SMI = WO2); or Regimental Sergeant Major Instructor (RSMI = WO1) …to instruct cadets in the APC syllabus, AIs have to pass the relevant courses, and have specific TORs commensurate with rank/experience; e.g. there are Company (Sector) SMIs, and an RSMI would be responsible for several Companies, in addition to a County RSMI. The ATC analogy would be having a Sector WO, and (for example) two (or more) Deputy WWOs under the direction of the WWO.

  3. Officers in the ACF either command a unit (although there are also AI Det Cdrs), or are Company and County (Sector and Wing) Staff Officers.

As such - I would argue - there is much greater clarity of CFAV roles and responsibilities in the ACF, and there is incentive at every level to progress. The majority of ACF staff are uniformed (otherwise they cannot instruct cadets or command a unit!), and there is an approximate 2/3 SNCO/WO to 1/3 Officer split in the uniformed staff cadre (according to the ACF website).

Compare that to the ATC.

According to the recruitment presentation given to the 2014 ACO Conference, the current figures are:

  • 6,246 CIs
  • 1,795 SNCOs & WOs
  • 3,359 Officers

So:

  • 11,400 CFAVs in the ATC
  • 55% of CFAVs are CIs
  • 45% of CFAVs are uniformed
  • 65% of uniformed CFAVs are Officers
  • 35% of uniformed CFAVs are SNCOs/WOs

It seems that 10 years after the introduction of Adult SNCOs, the ATC is still hugely top-heavy with Officers. It is almost the exact opposite of the ACF, which at 2/3 AIs and 1/3 Officers is 67% SNCOs/WOs and 33% Officers.

  1. Why have we got / do we need so many Officers?
  2. I would be willing to bet the majority of Officers are Flt Lts …why such a “senior” rank?
  3. Is a re-balancing not massively over-due? We often hear that we are - as a Corps - “short of Officers”, but the figures show the exact opposite!!

Why not:

(a) Redefine/clarify the role of CIs - restricting the delivery of certain activities and training to uniformed staff would arguably provide an additional incentive to go into uniform.

(b) Redefine the role of SNCOs - restrict placing SNCOs & WOs in command of Sqns to FS and WOs (thus Sgts have to learn the Functional Role of the SNCO, on the job, at a Sqn, and not worry about being approached to take command - although they may have an Executive Role secondary duty, e.g. Training Officer). Clarify the functional role of SNCOs, and adjust the establishment of Wings to include Sector WOs.

© Limit the promotion of WOs - Only promote suitable SNCOs to WO if (1) they are a Sqn Cdr, or (2) they are being promoted to an Exec Role such as Sector WO, Deputy WWO, or WWO. Ideally there would be a WOs course at ATF to support this, and specific TORs for Sector WOs, Deputy WWOs, and WWOs should be created.

(d) Redefine the role of Officers - Only appoint Officers as Sqn Cdrs at larger Sqns (50 cadets+ ?), and then restrict rank to Fg Off. Newly commissioned Officers could serve in an Exec Role at larger Sqns, and could take up a command after completing the Jnr Off Development Programme (ACTO94) and on promotion to Fg Off after 2 years. Officers in the rank of Flt Lt and above would be WSOs (e.g. Flt Lt WSOs with a “functional responsibility”, e.g. WGLO, Training Officer, DofE Officer, First Aid Officer, etc.); and Sqn Ldrs would be Sector Cdrs with line-management responsibilities.

Quite a rant, I know, but hopefully a productive discussion will ensue…

Cheers
BTI

2

One quick question - why do you consider Flt Lt to be ‘such a senior rank’?

It’s just a time-served rank in the forces…

3

quote=“bti” post=18893]…Why not…[/quote]

why?

none of the problems i’ve seen in the ACO are caused by the ‘flexiplan’ nature of who does what on this or that sqn - does any of the above, after all, matter to the cadet experience? - the problems that i see in staffing can be put into two main buckets:

a limited number of VR(T) who join and for some reason work as hard as possible to get away from having to deal with cadets as quickly as possible because being on a Sqn staff, rather than a Wing staff, is beneath them. unfortunately because they get onto wing staff, their effect far outweighs their numbers.

HQAC, RHQ, and WHQ’s produce and demand so much [strike]self-justifying, self-licking lollipop, drivel[/strike] paperwork that being an OC is not much fun and lots, and lots, of hard work. thats the reason, despite an apparant profusion of Officers, that no one wants to be an OC, not because the pyramid structure is out of kilter.

tbh, what you’ve written is nothing about the ATC and how it can be better, its purely an HQAC staff document that seeks to justify a big new project that builds the project manager an empire. with staff, and budget, something impressive on the CV and an extra three years being based in a nice part of the country (excellent school in Stamford, and the house prices are far more reasonable than you might think…), safe in the knowledge that if it goes badly the recalcitrant volunteers at Sqn level can be blamed.

4

I too have been saying this for ages.

Whilst the ‘promotion matrix’ says that some people may not involve themselves outside of the squadron and may therefore happily stay at Sgt, it’s really nothing more than paying lip service.
The current approach seems to be “everyone and anyone can achieve promotion all the way up WO if they put a little effort in”.
I’d say that it should be more like “anyone can become a good Sgt. If they are very good they might make FS. Not everyone will be a WO”.

We need to stop looking at promotion as a simple progression of reward for nothing more than carrying out a few basic aspects of service, and make it more about actually being better than the rest.

Encourage people to pick a specialization if they wish, and then ensure that they progress with it. There’s so little emphasis on CPD in our organization.

The SCC have a good system which I believe goes something like this:
To progress from Acting Petty Officer to PO they’ve got to jump through more hoops than we do with our simple one week course at ATF. By the time they get to PO they should already have method of instruction and GSK.

PO to CPO requires (I think) 5 years service at PO; develop an instructional specialization (Drill instructor, Weapon instructor, Sailing, that kind of thing); pass a CPO promotion course; and then pass a board.
If someone just wants to do general training and not become a specialist, then they stay as PO.

By the time people get to CPO they’re pretty well top of their game! To get to WO they’ve go to be top notch and filling some particular post.

We should do something similar.

I’d limit FS to those people who actually stand out above their peers, not just those who’ve done a couple of things in their 4 years at Sgt.
One of the boxes to tick for FS is “attend a blues camp”. You don’t even have to be any good! You could turn up, be basically useless for the week, and still automatically get that tick towards FS.

I’d limit WO to a number of appointments.
For example, WWO; Dep WWO; Maybe up to 4 Sector WOs; Band WO; A large Sqn commanded by a Sqn Ldr could be entitled to a Sqn WO (smaller units would be limited to FS Discip); Then perhaps a set number of ‘additional’ positions that could be applied for. If there’s maybe some sort of training team which it’s felt needs a WO for example. Apply to Region for approval… Something like that.

At a time when there’s much talk about bringing all uniformed staff into the VR(T) I think it would be wise to take the opportunity to make our staff more professional.

5

[quote]angus wrote:
none of the problems i’ve seen in the ACO are caused by the ‘flexiplan’ nature of who does what on this or that sqn - does any of the above, after all, matter to the cadet experience?[/quote]

Not to decry any issues that you may have seen, but that doesn’t prevent there being structural and organisational problems that you haven’t (seen). Also, the “cadet experience” is affected (negatively) by structural imbalance - if staff are not functioning properly in their roles (ill-defined, currently, as they are) then the organisation is not functioning properly. If the organisation is not functioning properly, it cannot properly and fully deliver the “cadet experience”. For example, how many Sqns suffer from poorly training Cdt NCOs in drill, dress, & discip matters; but don’t have the relevant/suitably experienced/trained staff to support them? Were their Sector to have a Sector WO, whose responsibility - amongst many others! - was to assist with the training and standardisation of Cdt NCOs; and whose post was properly established, and filled by a suitably experienced, selected, and trained individual, that problem would be remedied through a structural and systemic solution, not a solution that relied on the wherewithal of the Sqn and added to their burden of work.

[quote]the problems that i see in staffing can be put into two main buckets:

a limited number of VR(T) who join and for some reason work as hard as possible to get away from having to deal with cadets as quickly as possible because being on a Sqn staff, rather than a Wing staff, is beneath them. unfortunately because they get onto wing staff, their effect far outweighs their numbers.[/quote]

I can’t speak to that experience, but the reason I wanted to become a WSO - having been a Sqn Officer and then a Sqn Cdr for 15yrs (combined) - was, having made a difference at my Sqn, I wanted to try and make a difference within my Wing. I suspect most WSOs are the same, but I accept there are people (in all walks of life - lets be honest!) who wish to “climb the greasy pole” ASAP …and not all for the betterment of the organisation, and the service of others.

Although I don’t fully agree with your statement, the admin burden on Sqns and Sqn Cdrs is a very real problem. However, in my experience, part of this at least is caused by a lack of training given to other staff who could help with that burden, often compounded by a lack of managerial competence/experience on the part of the Sqn Cdr. Delegation (but not derogation!) is the way forward …but in order to be able to delegate to other staff, they have to be properly trained in their role - which brings me back to the importance of the clarity of roles and responsibilities.

I disagree with that conclusion, but accept that it is becoming increasingly difficult to interest people in taking command. However, my view is that being prepared to take a command, and understanding that is going to happen at some point, should be integral to commissioning people. What is the point, otherwise, of having Officers? If you can commission, then spend your days as a Sqn Officer, Adj, or Trg Off; then - in my view - that is a waste of a commissioned post. I think that Officers should, ultimately, know that they will be required to take a command (within reasonable travelling distance of their home) once they are suitably experienced as a Sqn Officer (having completed the JODP) …if people are not prepared to accept the burden of that responsibility, don’t commission. Simple.

Sorry, but that’s absolute rubbish, although you are of course entitled to your opinion. If the Corps itself, through its units and formations, is not properly organised; of which staffing is one of the greater issues, how can it possibly deliver properly the “cadet experience” that we so often talk of? If staff roles and responsibilities were clearly defined, and properly structured, the delivery of activity and training throughout the Corps would improve, which in turn would drive the improvement of the cadet experience.

[quote]MattB wrote:
why do you consider Flt Lt to be ‘such a senior rank’?
It’s just a time-served rank in the forces…[/quote]

True of course, but my argument is structured so as to give progression - alternatively you could limit Sqn Cdrs to Flt Lt, since you might have a Plt Off/Fg Off as your Trg Off or Adj …but in my model that would be for larger Sqns only, since only larger Sqns would have an Officer as the Sqn Cdr. In turn, this is only because we now allow SNCOs & WOs to become Sqn Cdrs - my logic being - if we are accepting that you don’t need to be an Officer to become a Sqn Cdr, what do we need Officers for/what should be their role? My answer is - as the OC of larger Sqns, and as WSOs …plus start to recruit and train much lower numbers of Officers (and start to being to turn that 65% / 35% Officer / OR split around), which of course also means you can be correspondingly more selective and drive up standards.

[quote]wdimagineer2b wrote:
We need to stop looking at promotion as a simple progression of reward for nothing more than carrying out a few basic aspects of service, and make it more about actually being better than the rest[/quote]

Yes, yes, yes - and - link that to clearly defined roles & responsibilities, and a well-structured Wing establishment which embeds Sector-isation through the creation of Sector Staff Officers; e.g. Sector WOs, in addition to Sector Cdrs.

Radical thinking! However, we need to professionalise our structural arrangements first - starting with roles and responsibilities, halting the role-creep, and having establishments to reflect that.

Efficiency and excellence in any organisation surely start with the basics - “who does what, and what do they do”. Its time for the Corps to go back to those basics and address whether they are currently fit for purpose.

Cheers
BTI

6

I agree. A set idea of what is expected of people at each rank and in different posts is absolutely critical.

A sectorized, well structured plan is a good way to go; but is of course only as good as the people you appoint to posts.
Down here, we’ve had Sector WO/SNCOs for several years now and whilst one or two have been good, unfortunately some of the post holders have simply been useless. Others have been okay, but somewhat lacking in ability.

I feel that, had the criteria for promotion been stricter from the start we might now have some very plausible candidates for promotion to WO and appointment to such posts.
Unfortunately people have for too long been able to get away with being mediocre and now we’ve got a lot of FS and WO who are little better than they were 6+ years ago when they were new Sgts.

I tend to rate people on their ability to do a job, their level of knowledge, and their ability to carry off the rank.
Some achieve that high standard and if you removed the ATC or VRT pins they could easily be confused with regular RAF personnel of that rank. They’re doing something right.
Others just stand out a mile as being a stereotypical “cadet instructor”. It’s those who tend who give a bad impression and who really need further instruction, instead of being ‘rewarded’ with a promotion.

We should really focus on improving staff Knowledge, Skill, and Attitude across all ranks.

7

I’m sorry but I think I’ve missed something with your model/argument. As I understand you your model is that sqns of a certain size would be commanded by a WO with large sqns being commanded by a Flt Lt.

Surely before taking command of a large sqn as a Flt Lt, you’ll need to give that individual experience of commanding a smaller unit or are you envisaging an officer going straight from being Training Officer or Adj? Also what about the WO who works hard running a sqn and does it sucessfully - where is they’re progression or are you going to say “Yes WO Bloggs we know you’ve be running that unit for ages and done a good job but we have to give the role to the officer who has never commanded before you’re not commissioned” ?

Also working from the RAF model you give the new officers the experience in command by giving them a small group first and then building them up as you go. So a Plt Off gets a detached flight (circa 25 personnel) supported by a Sgt, Fg Off gets a flight of 30 to 50 total personnel supported by a FS and a Flt Lt gets a full Sqn of 50 - 80 personnel with a full WO. Working an establishment model purely on structure is likely to produce a lovely theoretical model which doesnt actually work in reality.

The second problem I think you’ve overlooked is that your model doesn’t allow for change. We have a Sqn that has hit the bottom and has 15 cadets. You put a WO in charge of running the sqn and they do a really good job and bring the numbers up. What do you do when the sqn reaches the number to become ‘large’ - do you then sack the WO saying “sorry old chap, fantastic job but the sqn’s too big now to be trusted to an NCO”? If that is your plan then what motivation is there for the WO to keep improving the sqn but to just reach a plateau and keep it there. (i.e. Don’t be too good or you’ll lose command etc.)

You can’t say well make them an officer as the individual may not want to or tick that boxes to go to the next stage.

Finally I would ask you to clairfy your stats - you stated that there were 3,359 officers in the ACO -

  1. does this include CCF RAFs which don’t have any SNCOs
  2. How many of these Officers are at Sqn Level?
  3. Do you have a rank break down for the ACO in terms of VR(T) at Plt Off, Fg Off & Flt Lt.

Working on some rough calculations -
Assuming 200 CCF with 2 Officers per Section gives 400 - leaving us with 2959
Assume HQAC has 6 VR(T) officers - 2953
Assuming each region has 5 VR(T) officers (30) - leaves us with 2923
36 Wing Commanders - leaves us with 2887
Assume each wing has 5 WSO (180) - 2707
Assuming each of the 1009 Sqn has an Officer Commanding it leaves 1698

On your stats below there are 1795 SNCOs compared to 1698 junior officers making at sqn level ratio of 1 Officer to 1.06 SNCO. I have however under estimated the number of VRT not based at Sqn which mean the ratio would be much higher. Also there are a lot of CCFs with more than two RAF Officers which will also skew the figures. The above is only rough calculations but on the face of it I would suggest you are trying to build a model using flawed data. I would also point out that the ACF model locally to where I am is failing miserably as they are having difficulty recruiting instructors.

It is becoming very rare now to see pilot officers and I am starting to wonder how many are going through and getting though the system. It is not going to do as any good if we have and aging population regarding rank with big wholes being left at junior level. All you are doing is changing the structure so that it looks like the mess that we have got ourselves into was what we intended all along.

A common theme that seams to be emerging across the ACO and the forum is that we are failing to match the roles to the volunteer and instead trying to force the volunteers to fit in with us. All these causes is unhappy volunteers who are not comfortable in their roles and get frustrated with what you are force them to do. You then ask them to move out of that slightly uncomfortable area where they are unhappy into something more stressful and then get surprised when the volunteer says no.

If the volunteer doesn’t want to do first aid as they have no interest then provided the squadron has plenty of staff the opportunity should be offered but not insisted. Same with instructional syllabus - I have a fantastic CI who teaches airmanship really well but has zero interest in being in uniform and doing drill and the like. If we forced him down that route he would either do a really poor job as it is of zero interest to him or just refuse out right and walk. The moment we start restricting what our volunteers can do is the moment we end up like saint john’s and watch it all fall apart as people walk with their feet.

Your comment about the fact of people being made aware that if they are commissioned then they they will be made a sqn commander is a bit of a red herring. The vast majority of those applying for commission are aware of this and actually welcome it at their board [It is listed in para 29 of Guide to Commissioning VR(T)]. Unfortunately when it gets to six years later and they’ve been sodded about, over stressed, bullied and generally unsupported or developed, then it should come as no surprise that they don’t really fancy taking on more rubbish.

As roles & responsibilities goes chapter 3 in the guide to commissioning seam to have got things down clearly. However this issue comes when individuals don’t go along with the chain of command and want to do things their own way leading to sqn politics, back-stabbing and bullying. The management of expectations of an individuals it the main thing that we fail with in the organisation. From the looks of things, matters are being addressed and new staff are being recruited with the correct expectations in mind. Unfortunately we are stuck with a lot of the old guard so it is going to take 5 to 10 years for the new intakes to bear fruit.

8

You forgot to account for all the VGS officers against zero establishment for VGS SNCOs too?

9

Sorry about that so I have - if we assume 4 Officers at 25 VGS that means that the Sqn Officer count goes down to 1598 making the Sqn Officer to SNCO ratio 1 : 1.12

Not a massive difference but something that will start to make the stats to creep up.

Also to factor in is the geographic layout as it is completely pointless if the majority of the officers are in the remote parts of Scotland or the like as unlike the regular air force we cannot ship people a round the country to where we need to but are forced to recruit locally.

Taking the area of the UK as 243,610km2 then we get an Officer density of one officer for every 152km2 or 1 every 60 Square Miles (for SNCOs its one every 136km2) - as this is the UK average it might be worth comparing the region break down, purely out of interest.

10

Why should you have an incentive for going into uniform?

I will never step into uniform within the ATC. And have no intentions of getting into any uniformed service again. And I would imagine there are others that feel the same.

Why should experience be shunned off just because people dont want to be uniformed?
Its a youth organisation sponsered by the Military, my experience and teachings towards the cadets shouldnt be dictated to by what I have to wear.

We do need a uniformed element of staff but why cant you allow CIs to be just that, Instructors. The ACF are completely wrong in the way they handle CIs. They would probably see an incease in adult staff with good experience if they came over to the ATC way.

11

[quote=“RearAdmiralScrinson” post=18926]Why should you have an incentive for going into uniform?
I will never step into uniform within the ATC. And have no intentions of getting into any uniformed service again. And I would imagine there are others that feel the same.
Why should experience be shunned off just because people dont want to be uniformed?
Its a youth organisation sponsered by the Military, my experience and teachings towards the cadets shouldnt be dictated to by what I have to wear.
We do need a uniformed element of staff but why cant you allow CIs to be just that, Instructors. The ACF are completely wrong in the way they handle CIs. They would probably see an incease in adult staff with good experience if they came over to the ATC way.[/quote]

Ah Ha - so you haven’t ruled out VR(T) service in the ACO then :stuck_out_tongue:

In all seriousness, I agree with you in the main but there must always be an incentive for the volunteer to take that next step as it provides that opportunity for development. Even the scouts have a similar structure to ourselves in terms of roles (albeit without the ranks). However it shouldn’t penalise the volunteer that choose not to from doing the majority of the organisations activities. Also looking at the ACFs training time it requires 4 weekends to become a CI and a further 3 weekends plus a week training course to get to be a SI. Far too long for a volunteer who just wants to jump in and get going when you could get things done in one.
It would be interesting to see their retainment stats to see how many start but cannot complete the training.

1 Like
12

Why is there this belief that all staff somehow seek personal development? The avenue should be open for those who wish to walk it but there must also be an option for people who just want to be left alone and get on with what they do well.

13

Heretic!

The fundemental questions to be asked are
Why don’t people find a uniform role attractive?
Why don’t some of those who commission want a command?
These are largely why so called role creep has come about. But then in the real world, without “role creep” many organisations/businesses would have gone under years ago. If the sort of demarcation suggested existed now as it did when I first started work, I’d be signing on.

Unless this is understood and accepting all reasons without prejudice you are not going to be able to formulate any plan. But I don’t think people at the top are interested. Their solution would be pretty much as is being intimated here; much stronger demarcation between the civilian and uniform staff and between the two uniform cadres.

The irony is that the modern RAF and there a few on here who feel we should have a much closer working practices, is increasingly civilian as the number of uniformed personnel drop for whatever reasons. I imagine the personnel numbers bandied around for the RAF don’t include the civilian workforce.

Personally I think role creep is a good thing as it allows people to get a feel for things As a CI I did a number of jobs and as a WO I was in charge of the sqn for weeks at a time when the CO was away with his job. The latter gave me a taste of command and I wanted more. On a squadron I want people who are willing and prepared to take on a role and not (with a couple of exceptions) based on the clothes and badges they wear. While we have a civilian instructor system people should only go into uniform IF it is what they want to do and not be forced. If you force people down a route then one of two things, they leave or they become a pain to manage. If people don’t like the idea of CIs, which is pretty much how I read it, then the only solution is to ditch the CI system altogther such that when someone pitches up after a CRB they are given a uniform and a badge. This then creates a whole raft of problems; uniform supply, accommodation on RAF stations, older people of the same “rank” as teenagers. A route to overcome this is introduce an upper age limit on staff recruitment.

I find it interesting that the notion of specialisation is suggested in one breath and then promotion to WO is restricted it seems to the drill pigs in the next. As there is much talk of alignment with the RAF, however in the RAF I’ve come across more SNCOs and WOs who aren’t drill pigs than are. This is a flaw in the ATC’s mindset?

From what I’ve seen of the ACF a lot more staff walk away. I’ve seen a number go as they got fed up with the way the ACF works. When our local Det Cdr visits he comments on the number of staff we have in comparison to him and he’s a little envious. So RAS may have a point.

14

[quote=“Chief Tech” post=18913]
It is becoming very rare now to see pilot officers and I am starting to wonder how many are going through and getting though the system. It is not going to do as any good if we have and aging population regarding rank with big wholes being left at junior level.[/quote]

Around my neck of the woods this is very much a reality. Pilot Officers are becoming a rare species and Flying Officers seem to almost be extinct. The last few wing camps and field days I have noticed that there are very few of these ranks present.

15

[quote=“born middle aged” post=18940][quote=“Chief Tech” post=18913]
It is becoming very rare now to see pilot officers and I am starting to wonder how many are going through and getting though the system. It is not going to do as any good if we have and aging population regarding rank with big wholes being left at junior level.[/quote]

Around my neck of the woods this is very much a reality. Pilot Officers are becoming a rare species and Flying Officers seem to almost be extinct. The last few wing camps and field days I have noticed that there are very few of these ranks present.[/quote]

I have been told by a baby Plt Off who has just returned from OASC that they said that the pass rate was in the order of 25%. No wonder the are so few Plt Offs around.

16

At the end of the day what matters is giving the cadets good experiences, values and skills to crack on with life regardless of joining up or not.
It shouldnt matter whether I wear a uniform to teach and help, I have done my time, proved to myself what I can acheive. It shouldnt be about me lording over the cadets.

If you start pushing people into uniform, you will lose them. The ACO needs a uniformed part agreed. But it also can benifit greatly from CIs. Theres a lot of ex forces who would like to help out but dont want a uniform again.
If people want to go into uniform, thats great. But its not all that the ACO have to offer.

Its a disciplined youth organisation theres a time and place for uniform, drill and shouty bits. But its not everything the ACO is about.

1 Like
17

[quote=“the silverback” post=18941][quote=“born middle aged” post=18940][quote=“Chief Tech” post=18913]
It is becoming very rare now to see pilot officers and I am starting to wonder how many are going through and getting though the system. It is not going to do as any good if we have and aging population regarding rank with big wholes being left at junior level.[/quote]

Around my neck of the woods this is very much a reality. Pilot Officers are becoming a rare species and Flying Officers seem to almost be extinct. The last few wing camps and field days I have noticed that there are very few of these ranks present.[/quote]

I have been told by a baby Plt Off who has just returned from OASC that they said that the pass rate was in the order of 25%. No wonder the are so few Plt Offs around.[/quote]

If 75% of that (particular) course weren’t good enough to commission then that’s the way it is. You have to question why 75% of those people weren’t weeded out at Wing Board stage?

I understand that the overall pass rate for OASC is somewhere around 65%.

18

The review of the establishment scales that has been ongoing since the release of ACP 20 this time last year should hopefully look to resolve this issue, which primarily is where people’s loyalties lie. The question is how many of these Wing Staff are constantly working towards delivering the cadet experience, how many just disappear off the radar and appear at the odd wing event, and the one activity they organise each year? The people that do this are wasted, and should really look at getting back involved with a unit and asking how can I help.

The LASER review was 11 years ago, perhaps we should have LASER II that looks into the current issues, and involves the movement of SNCOs to VR(T) potentially, as well as sectorisation which is something that did not exist at the time of LASER I, as well as addressing the age question that has been posed by CAC. I would argue however that a Sector WO is not required as the WWO should be covering this by regularly visiting squadron’s and being available fro advice form inexperienced staff; some units will need more care than others, and this would be determined by the WSO (now scaled). In a wing of 4 Sectors, you remove 4 WOs from on Sqn roles without replacement, no doubt they would if asked be happy to visit an alternative unit to provide guidance should the WWO be unable to do so.

There is a lot right with this organisation, but there is also a lot wrong with it, and maybe radical change is what is needed to resolve these issues than a range of different reviews that as yet have failed to deliver any changes, due to the geographic spread of Review members - ABRT, TCoS, Camps and Shooting to come

We have a brave commandant who is not adverse to change but she could be firmer and push these plans through quicker if she so desired, by committing the right people, in a focused way; it might even stop all the rumours of perceived changes that keep being generated due to reduced time-scales. We are still awaiting a revised FT Policy following the Bivi ban that has now been in place for over a month, with no further update provided as to reasoning or time-scale for normal service to resume! This lack of communication only leads to rumour.

19

[quote=“noah claypole” post=18945]If 75% of that (particular) course weren’t good enough to commission then that’s the way it is. You have to question why 75% of those people weren’t weeded out at Wing Board stage?

I understand that the overall pass rate for OASC is somewhere around 65%.[/quote]
The Wing board is weak tool. I was speaking to our Wg Cdr last year who had done a course to conduct the interview and he said by comparison to the old style boards, the new one being a scripted affair wasn’t really designed to select people per se and although there is a scoring system, it is open to subjectivity.

While I accept OASC are screening us on a similar basis to regular Commissions, talking to a few who have been pass and fail, I still think we need something slightly more tailored to the ACO experience wrt commissioned service and looking more so at maturity and breadth of life experience, than what you did at school or will some bloke get to the train station on time. How many regulars, I await the brickbats, can regularly be put into a command situation dealing with the breadth of problems and issues such staff recruitment, financial dealings, welfare issues for adults and teenagers, parents complaining/moaning, civilian welfare committees, local community liaison etc, that your average ATC commissioned officer can face, within a couple of years of commissioning. Any of us who have been sqn cdrs for more than a week know of what I speak. While I recognise that regular commissioned officer will deal with things we never will, they will during their developmental period, have a lot of experienced and knowledgable people around them to guide them through.

20

has anyone done a review into OASC’s results?

while, in principle, i like the fact that selection for VR(T) contains a bigger hurdle than previously, i think it would be an idea for the ACO to look at what OASC selects and what it rejects.

a) does OASC reject people who, while not brilliant, are - in light of of the cronic staff shortage - good enough for the VR(T)?

b) does OASC select people who, while brilliant for the RAF, aren’t really suitable for the VR(T)?

c) its not really OASC’s problem, but what happens to the 35% who fail? there will be a percentage who should never have been allowed within 500ft of a cadet organisation to start with, but what of the rest - do they run off never to be seen again, or do they go back to what they were doing previously?

its all well and good having VR(T) selection ‘contracted out’ to OASC because they are a profesional selection organisation, but imv it would be foolish to think it can all be left to them and all will be well - the ACO has different needs to the RAF, and the ACO will be putting different people into the selection machine, unless the ACO keeps a very close watch on OASC to see that its on VR(T) setting and not ‘steely-eyed dealer of death’ setting (or as close to steely-eyed dealer of death as the paramilitary wing of EasyJet gets…), then the ACO could be creating a rod for its own back: its all very well only selecting the really good applicants as officers, but if units can’t function because of a shortage ‘he/she’ll do…’ officers then the ACO is in trouble.

i’m entirely behind any attempt to improve the quality of the VR(T) - and the rest of the adult staff - i’ve seen some utter horrors in my time, the lazy, the incompetant, the drunk (i hope they were drunk…), the power-crazed, the a-bit-too-fond-of-cadets, the walters and the socially inadequate looking for a home, but i think the ACO needs to be careful about just assuming that OASC will get it right.