not armed I hope?
Two. One for each hand.
IIRC, my army days saw me with a weapon but no ammunition.
We were only working the main intelligence base in the UK, what could possibly go wrong?
Remember the WHT for the Sledgehammer Handle?..
‘Army’ and ‘Intelligence’ … not two words often seen together ! 
(…just a bit of banter!)
Fire Pickett had a pick axe handle
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When I was a cadet in the 1980s, me and another cadet had to man the gate of Penally Training Camp. In those days the senior unit had to provide the guard for the camp. No MoD guard force in them days. The TA unit left early leaving the ATC as the only unit on camp. As such the staff chose two older cadets to “man” the gate and guardroom. Weapon of choice was a pickaxe handle.
I got into that very same base by showing an empty window wallet once. (I honestly believed my MOD 90 was in there, but it was still in my shorts from an earlier run.)
Lots of local women used to find it incredibly easy to get in, especially when the MPGS were familiar with the men escorting them onto the base and would just wave them through.
It’s astounding that something more serious than Brize hasn’t happened there.
I got onto Ramstein with my MOD90 and a NATO movement order provided by a mate based there (being a USAF base you can’t just come on with an MOD90).
Was on the beer in the British bar with her and her boss amongst many others, her boss was very suprised when I mentioned I was a CFAV and wondered how I had obtained a NATO movement order. (Turned out my mate who worked in admin had just slipped it into a pile for the Sqn Ldr to sign!)
2013 I was escorted onto RAF Lakenheath with an out of date SIA Licence with a friend who was working for the USAF. Gate chap wasn’t sure but my mate said I’d be ok and we were just doing the food shop for him (Steaks were cheap and delicious)
Still got the entry chit in my desk 
Recent events at Brize Norton have prompted me to highlight the dangers of false confidence in security processes and procedures. I don’t want to jump on the accusation band wagon and media flurry, yes, it is embarrassing that this could happen, but the key thing is that we learn from the incident.
So, what can we learn from this? No doubt a number of issues will arise, but from my experience of doing both physical and cyber security assessments I know one thing for certain, over confidence in your security will only lead to embarrassment. If someone tells you that it “is not possible” to enter this Site/Building/Room/System etc then be very wary.
Let’s take a perimeter fence for example, we put a fence around an area and place razor wire on the top. Does that stop someone getting inside the enclosed area? No. A fence is a deterrent, the better the fence, the better the deterrent but it still won’t stop a determined attack. That said, to a law-abiding person, a fence looks imposing and gives a sense of security. It is this false perception of security that is dangerous.
How do you overcome this false sense of security? Test your security. Many organisations now conduct regular vulnerability assessments on their information systems, the value in this is understood. Do the same for your physical environments, conduct physical penetration tests.
Unfortunately, RAF Brize Norton has found out it’s vulnerabilities the hard way, the intruders did their diligence and found a vulnerability to exploit. The media will be hounding the MOD and in particular RAF Brize Norton for this but in truth I doubt they are alone; they are just the first to be caught out. Now let’s figure out what happened, how it can be prevented in the future, close the vulnerabilities in other areas and continue to learn. Just as importantly, when we fix this vulnerability let’s not assume that the problem is solve. The threat is always there and is always evolving, your security must do the same.
The thing is, we don’t even put a razer wire fence around the whole of our sites. Heathrow is better protected compared to Brize.
That’s the fence at the end of the runway. The pan is then only a short run away.
(As a fun fact, the new bit of fencing there is from the An225 back in 2021 when it blew the fence down during take off!)
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There’s no practical way to raise the height of that fence (even with razor wire) without recalculating the ILS minima and I don’t know if the metal wire would interfere with the glideslope. (Might even have to displace the threshold.) Or, re-route the road further east so the fence line can move with it. £millions, probably, given what road work costs these days.
Sadly it’s far from the only station where the proper security fencing is more for show than anything else as it is not 100% all the way round.
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Heathrow has massive fences all the way around. Albeit they are slightly further from the runway.
I certainly wouldn’t want to try and get over that!
Gatwick has a very close fence at one end:
They drop the height, but have razor wire on top and very overt CCTV too.
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££££££££££££
Whilst it is not a problem no money is spent
Now its a problem - Kerching!!
Heathrow/Gatwick have higher profile due to numbers of people etc - nobody wants anything to happen there. Military installations are considered by most to be secure (because they are military), until they are proven otherwise.
If they have overt security then it proves that is where the value is
Also compare the security at an F35 location to that at Officer Phase 1 Training location
How many units have public roads running through them?
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No longer security protocols - so able to tell the story.
At Marham - Victor tankers + Tonka sqns. You had to wear produced clip on badge / pass that had your photo + several letters - those crossed out = no access to the designated areas / sqns without approval. Everyone was using this as the “gospel” for access, but it was such a simplistic badge that anyone could produce / laminate one. No-one was asking for the then F1250 (MOD90 of today) for verification.
I went to OC Plod (we had been on the same flt at Henlow officer trg) & expressed my reservations. Nah, he said, it’s all fine. So, I asked his permission to do a security check - no problem said he. Got him to write a memo to avoid any enthusiastic “actions” if I go caught.
Thirty mins later (to pre-empt him sending out a warning!), I went to one of the Tonka sqns - NOT on my access rights according to my stn-produced pass. However, on the “Blue Peter, here’s one I prepared earlier” pass, I had base-wide access. Went into their Adjt’s office & said that I had come to do a no-notice security page check on a random security document - it did happen - I suggested the Stn War Plan as I has normal access to that on my sqn. My false pass got a look over & passed muster.
The sgt got the document, I did the page check & signed the page check section.
Wandered back to OC Plod, told him the story, he didn’t believe me. He went to see my page check signature. Gulp.
System changed drastically after that! 
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The majority of security in everyday life is about keeping honest people honest.
Lock on a door, padlock on a gate, a fence, a camera - it all just stops anyone’s little mind gremlin from being an opportunist.
And generally that’s enough, because the few dishonest and determined enough individuals are typically a low enough ratio that the risk and loss balance is acceptable.
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As above, most security is basically telling ‘normal’ people ‘Don’t come in here …its dangerous/secret etc’
…for the other 0.001% (I hope that’s all) it is seen as a challenge/game and unfortunately most fences / gates will never stop a determined mischief maker / foe.
I reckon movement sensors that play dogs barking (from a distance …as that adds doubt!) - and obviously set off a proper alarm somewhere!, would make most people at least pause (no pun intended!) and think if they want a large dog hanging off of them in the near future!
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From my intelligence days, items such as fences, locks etc are not just deterrents; they’re delays.
A dedicated intruder will still be able to access any items anywhere on the base given sufficient time, but using the right security materials will delay them long enough that a person with a rifle can turn up and gently persuade them not to continue.
I don’t see a reason why the pans couldn’t be protected the same way the former E3D dispersal (now the RAFAT dispersal) is at Waddington.
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