So before trying to grow cadet numbers we need to:
1 improve CFAV recruitment
2 streamline the onboarding process
3 improve the training offer for new staff
4 improve retention of current staff (the ‘volunteer offer’)
Have I missed any?
So before trying to grow cadet numbers we need to:
1 improve CFAV recruitment
2 streamline the onboarding process
3 improve the training offer for new staff
4 improve retention of current staff (the ‘volunteer offer’)
Have I missed any?
that list is everything this forum has been talking about since…well ever!
i would say there needs to be some improvement to accommodation/building infrastructure.
a review of suitability of accommodating 50x Cadets and Staff in the existing buildings - if this isn’t possible then there is little hope of maintaining item 4 if the building feels too small to operate.
I think this is the main challenge for expansion.
You also need to increase capacity of activities, so that all the current cadets can actually do them before adding more stress to the mix.
Flying, shooting, gliding, AT, Camps. None of those have a resource anywhere near the total demand currently, so adding 30% is going to make this infinitely worse.
…which needs an increase in the numbers of qualified staff??
I look forward to being encouraged to take more time out of a busy home life so that I’m allowed to take even more time out of a busy home life…
I’m running a L98 shoot later this month, initially it was LR but a previous shoot got canned so I’ve adapted and will be doing both long & short.
I had 60 places… 47 have been allocated to cadets and 5 to staff, leaving me with 13% capacity (before any on the day drop outs)
There is a pipeline challenge here of trained cadets but I think the pool is ~200 so I’ve got about 25% which is actually pretty good.
Its also a policy, and infrastructure issue, if you can only accommodate 40 cadets on a week camp, you can only train 40
this is exactly what i said above summarised by:
if we can reinstate the USP activities to a level where there is real opportunity and not the lucky two Cadets a year per Squadron to make the most of it then there is an attraction to the CFs.
firstly, by increasing capacity (returning to the ole days) there is greater chance of “retention” as Cadets will stick around longer knowing they have chance to take part in X or Y
Secondly, it will increase the appeal at a “recruitment” stage, as a Squadron can demonstrate 30-40-50% of Cadets have experienced X or Y in the last 6-12 months, with 70-80 in the last 18-24 months so new recruits can see that there are real opportunities to be had.
The bigger structural issue is the cadet forces have always exploited that spare capacity of the armed forces to deliver cadet activities.
So aircraft not being used at weekends, empty barrack blocks, ranges & training areas without booked slots surplus uniform/big uniform contracts all without effecting OPs.
Unfortunately the cuts to defence along with sub contracting & PFIs that spare capacity is no longer there as cadet forces have not been factored in.
This has meant no Air traffic control at weekends. Accommodation blocks & messing facilities unavailable, reduced aircraft number, uniform supply issues & generally a strategic uncoupling from the operational RAF as the military is more civilianised. Not only are there less RAF bases there is less capacity for RAF bases to host camps.
The sea cadets can mitigate this due to focus on water based activities. Whilst it’s more tricky todo the ACF can have smaller but more often field weekends.
With the air cadets it’s more difficult for our unique selling point as military aircraft are more limited & it’s highly specialist even before you starting factoring in the carbon footprint.m & associated Whitehall drive.
Drones may be a partial solution but the overall aim should be that 80% of cadets have an AEF or AEG in their first three years (average cadet service length) & the opportunity to attend one summer camp. We could try to specialise in other areas such as water activities, AT or fieldcraft but as their other cadets & scouting already lead on these areas we would probably cease to survive as a distinct & distinguishable youth organisation.
But regardless until you expand the regular military capacity with its reserve surplus you won’t be able to expand or deliver the cadet offer & therefore entice & retain Adult volunteers.
That’s the problem with trying to run anything ‘lean’, especially in defence. It’s well worth checking out the work of Dr Peter Roberts on this (the This Means War and How to Train a Military podcasts).
The potential upside is if (big if) HMG rebuilds more defence capacity and redundancy there will then be more space for the cadet forces.
I’m not sure the run down of the defence estate is still the right way to go either. Not withstanding the terrible state of a lot of it (yes Longmoor I’m looking at you)
I think the psychology is not “we need to save money” it’s “ I can’t be bothered about this & I don’t want to be responsible- how do I get it off my desk?”
PFI, sub-contracts transfers to other government departments, sold to development etc all due to the culture of it “make it someone else’s problem” & do what’s easiest not what’s right.
Like the NHS, PFI provides saw them coming and were dealing with people who had no experience of the commercial world, plus it wasn’t ‘their’ money which is a public sector failing.
i recall watching some military documentary about 15+ years ago talking about the MOD or more specifically the RAF.
the topic in question was the three RAF Stations in Germany, and budget cuts meant they had to get rid of one.
of the three, there was a clear winner in terms of strategic value, resources and the like, and it worked really well under the Station Commander. So much so, that was the one chosen to close. it was such an effective and efficient Station, that it was the only one when given the order, that would react accordingly and be with a hope of closing by the deadline
And now with the Ukrainians attacking Russian airfields across Russia, so few airfields remaining leaves us vulnerable to asymmetric warfare. HAS’s maybe na k in fashion again for the Typhoon/F35 forces.
The UK like any other airforce in the west is going to have to work out how to protect the larger assets in future, there again we can’t stop drones getting into prisons.
This is going to cost a lot of money and infrastructure.
I don’t get why we can’t stop drones in custody. Why not just put tall nets across the courtyards?
With those and the dogs barking at drones, we’d be sorted.
All bets are off when a truckload of drones deploys less than one minute’s flight time from airfield targets.
HAS complexes would be useful but cumbersome - GW1 showed that hitting the taxiways from a HAS site towards the runway was good enough to lock in the aircraft.
Maybe Phalanx-type systems would be appropriate for close-in airfield defence? Cheaper? Mobile?
Disperse your aircraft - much harder to cope with logistics / operations, but less of an instant tgt for drones. Bring back the Harrier!
For personnel working near aircraft, automatic shotguns would seem to be a good option against drones? Go back to WW2 trg, when aircraft gunners got some shotgun shooting to practice on leading a tgt / angles.
Didn’t GW1 also show that taxiways could be used as runways, craters can be quickly filled, etc, etc?
We used those to protect Basra Air Station against rockets and mortars, but I understand recent thinking is that EM effects and DE weapons are more cost effective against UAS / loitering munitions.
Harrier? Wait until you hear about something we call F-35B!
We were still routinely shooting clays when I was an infantryman in the ‘90s, as the same skills are useful for initial shots over open sights, any moving targets (not necessarily airborne), etc. In fact, didn’t I see something about air cadets shooting clays recently on SM?
You’re thinking of Top Gun: Maverick.
Or even an SA 7 two miles down on the runway heading. That’s part of the reason why civilian flights weee withdrawn from Kabul for Op Pitting.