Full interim report from Indian AAIB.
So the switches were both found in the normal run position. And records show they were switched off 1 second apart. One pilot questioned the other why they had done that, then shortly after they were switched back to the run position. But with not enough time to get back up to speed.
?
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ChatGPT said:
Summary of Preliminary Report: Air India B787-8 Crash (VT-ANB) at Ahmedabad – 12 June 2025
Aircraft: Boeing 787-8 (VT-ANB)
Operator: Air India
Flight: AI171 – Ahmedabad to London Gatwick
Date/Time: 12 June 2025, 0809 UTC
Location: Near Ahmedabad Airport, India
Fatalities: 260 (12 crew, 229 passengers, 19 on ground)
Key Findings:
- Accident Overview:
Aircraft crashed shortly after take-off from Runway 23.
Impacted BJ Medical College hostel ~0.9 NM from the runway.
Both pilots declared MAYDAY but could not recover.
No bird activity noted; weather was clear.
- Aircraft and Crew:
Aircraft was airworthy with valid certificates and within operational limits.
Pilots were adequately rested; Co-pilot was flying, Captain was monitoring.
No prior issues with the fuel control switches reported.
Crew underwent and passed pre-flight alcohol testing.
- Sequence of Events:
Engines shut down (fuel cutoff switches moved from RUN to CUTOFF) immediately after takeoff at ~180 KIAS.
One pilot asked, “why did you cutoff,” other replied “I didn’t.”
Both engines restarted midair but insufficient time for full recovery.
Aircraft lost altitude and crashed outside airport boundary.
- Wreckage and Damage:
Aircraft destroyed; debris spread across multiple buildings.
Significant structural and fire damage to five buildings.
Engines, wings, tail, landing gear found separated at various distances.
RAT (Ram Air Turbine) deployed automatically due to power loss.
- Flight Data Recorder (EAFR):
Forward EAFR data recovered, showing both fuel cutoff switches moved within 1 second.
Thrust levers were forward (takeoff power) until impact.
Audio confirms confusion in the cockpit during engine shutdown.
EAFR showed engine relight attempts but only partial recovery achieved.
- Maintenance and Airworthiness:
Recent minor technical issue (“STAB POS XDCR”) was addressed pre-flight.
Several MEL items were active but within valid limits.
A 2018 FAA bulletin warned of possible fuel control switch disengagement—Air India did not inspect switches since the advisory wasn’t mandatory.
- Investigation Progress:
Wreckage and engines secured for further examination.
Fuel samples from airport tanks were satisfactory.
Statements from witnesses and surviving passenger collected.
No safety recommendations issued yet; investigation ongoing.
Preliminary Conclusion:
The crash likely resulted from uncommanded movement of both fuel control switches to CUTOFF immediately after takeoff, leading to dual engine shutdown. Despite attempts to relight the engines, insufficient altitude and time led to impact. Investigators are still determining the cause of the switch activation.
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I instantly don’t trust this summary, as having just read the whole thing, it explicitly says that one pilot declares mayday. Not both.
Yeah i wouldnt use it for anything, but i still get the jist of it
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Im interested to see how this plays out
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To me, it doesn’t make sense with regard to the possibility of human intervention.
If there was the intention (for whatever the reason) for one of the pilots to do this, then there is no logic (not that you can probably apply logic to this conclusion) to putting the cut-off switches back onto the RUN position.
Similarly, if there was a physical fault with the switches & they were moved accidentally by a hand (or arm) moving to select another item (landing gear UP for example), then why the one sec gap between each cut-off switch being “knocked?” I would have expected a simultaneous selection.
Also, the potential for a physical fault like that doesn’t normally pop up for one flight; I would have expected tech write-ups previously to say something like “excessive movement in engine cut-off switches” with associated module change.
For example, on a previous aircraft type I operated, when the non-flying pilot selected the gear down, they said that the handle felt “different” & not the smooth movement that they normally expected (we didn’t raise the gear toi try it agin - no sirree!). So, in the tech log it went - yes, the engineers found there was part of the mechanism behind the lever that had come loose.
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Given the gear was down, is there any possibility of accidentally cutting the engines instead of selecting gear up?
I’m assuming there are in very different locations, but could PIC have flown another type recently where gear controls where in a similar place to the fuel control switch on the 787?
No.
The switches are on different panels and approx 90cm apart.
Of course doesnt preclude pilot having a total brain fart episode and not being congnisent of their actions.
Not likely.
The released records if their flying career dont indicate this at all.
More over, all boeings have the same (within reason) switch architecture / locations.
Everyone everywhere is talking around the issue. Its either 1 of only 3 broad possibilities.
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Some very low probability, unthought of technical issue.
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Suicide by pilot.
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Total failure of pilot actions and monitoring.
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Hmmm, you need to qualify “pilot actions.”
The flying pilot will, on take-off, be concentrating on the flight director / ADI. In simple terms, it should be straight ahead to XXXX ft (unless there is an early terrain avoidance turn for example - but even then, very unusual to be below 400 ft - Nice is a 400 ft turn if departing Rwy 04.).
Certainly very shortly after take-off (100 - 150 ft ), the flying pilot would see that the VSI is showing positive climb - & would command the non-flying pilot - “Positive rate, gear up.”
The non-flying pilot would acknowledge (silently - or if required by airline SOP, verbalise) by confirming positive rate on his / her VSI & select the gear handle to up.
The gear handle had been activated to the up position as the gear wheels were in the “toe down” position as the initial part of the gear raising sequence (think that’s the correct terminology) rather than the “heel down” position. Subsequent models of 787 have a slightly different sequencing.
So, even although the gear had only completed a very small part of the up sequence, it’s reasonable to exclude a “switch pigs” of selecting the cut-off switches by mistake instead of the gear lever. However, it would also seem reasonable to deduce that the cut-off switches were moved (or failed?) after the gear retraction had commenced.
Also, unless different for Air India / B787, the gear handle isn’t a “critical” switch / lever than requires confirmation / verification from the other pilot before moving it. Same for flaps / slats.
By critical, I mean power lever, or any linked switch relating to an abnormal or emergency checklist drill.
For example, an engine fire - the pilot flying would identify the situation - “Fire #1 engine.” This would be cross-checked by the non-flying pilot. Depending on aircraft type / checklist requirement, the flying pilot would call “Action checklist for fire drill #1 engine” or similar & normally take control of the radio communication (so that the other pilot can concentrate 100% on the checklist actrions).
The non-flying pilot would cross-check & confirm the correct engine for the drill - take hold of the #1 power level / cut-off switch - & then the verification process takes place by the non-flying pilot - “#1 power lever - confirmed?”
(Personally, I would also have my hand behind the working engine power lever just in case!)
Flying pilot would cross-check - “Confirmed.”
“#1 power lever to shut-off / closed.”
“#2 fire bottle - Confirmed?”
“Confirmed.”
“#2 fire bottle fired - clock running.”
“#2 fuel pump - Confirmed?”
Etc, etc.
Therefore, revisiting the points raised:
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Always a first time for anything - there were some very deep, exceptionally complicated discussions on other forums about multiple / cascade / electrical bus supply failures that could precipitate unforeseen consequences. No idea if that ends up as relevant - & no radio calls /nothing mentioned on interim report.
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As I alluded, why re-select the cut-off switches to RUN if this was the intent?
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Based on the gear having already been selected to the UP position, I can’t envisage any other movement of switches / controls. Depending on airline SOPs, weather conditions, & how busy the airspace was going to be (hand-flying for a while to maintain skills?), the next likely call (maybe 400-500 ft depending on airline / B787 SOP) would be from the flying pilot to instruct the non-flying pilot to engage the autopilot. Nothing to monitor or action.
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One set them to cut off, and the other tried to fix it?
I would have expected much more of a verbal inter-change had that been the case - same for content of the Mayday call.
With regard to the physical timings of events / operation of switches, someone on another forum has suggested that the date sampling from which the timeline is being calculated could be + / - one sec.
As he mentioned, it will be essential to analyse the full spectrum of the cockpit voice recorder to try to assess when / if the cut-off switches were physically moved. Note the important point that the data frame does NOT monitor the physical switch position:
The data frame is recording the state of the fuel control switch system, being OFF or RUN. It does not monitor the physical position of the switch itself. It is normally reasonable to infer that the state has followed the switch but at the risk of sounding like a broken record, electrical systems on aircraft are prone to issues with water ingress, and we have learnt that computer systems are also prone to bit flipping from cosmic radiation. I doubt that this is anything like Kev’s big day out at Learmonth, with QF072, but I also remain concerned over the potential for deluge of pooled water into the E&E bay, which has happened before. The evidence to put that to bed will be a spectral analysis of the time from liftoff onwards, looking for the signature of a switch being repositioned to OFF and then back to RUN. The Fuel Control Switches have an audible snap in most cases when repositioned. I would also spend a lot of time looking at the engine start case to detect the switch being positively locked into the RUN position.
When reading any of the data when it comes out, pay some attention to the sampling rate of the data being provided, it is quite possible to make erroneous assumptions where that is not taken into consideration. The data buses used to get data from the aircraft system to the recorder, and the recorders themselves use sequential sentences, and various rates.
It seems the media are questioning the mental health of the aircraft captain this morning. Some suggestions that following the death of his mother he’s been struggling with his elderly father. It’s not unknown for this situation to result in tragedy. Thinking of the German Wings incident some years back.
Exactly what i said. Just without 1000 words or a part D training manual thrown in.
Maybe the other pilot reselected them. IF the F/O went all hari-kari and used the fuel cut offs, it could easily have been the Capt who was Pilot Monitoring who noticed and switched them back. Or vice-versa.
My original assumption and statement of 3 was that the pilot actions werent a simple break in SoPs but a full deviation for whatever reason, some sort of uber brain fart if you will.
…
Now the point i was really trying to make now seemingly pointless is no matter how it is dressed up, until all facts are known and until the accident report is released we can only deduce it is one of thr 3 i put forward.
- Tech.
- Suicide.
- Brain fart.
.
Something worth considering.
IF it was suicide.
The pilot choosing to do so, chose a very (relatively) slow method.
Yes - selecting the fuel cut offs to off would take only 1 to 2 seconds. But then waiting for the engines to spool down. The aircraft lose energy and finally decend took many many more.
Perhaps they regreted their decision…
Pure speculation.
…
I just cant see how the switches could BOTH fail under a tech scenario.
All in all. Just another accident report to come.
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As mentioned previously, the data sampling / recording does not record the physical cut-off switch position.
If the transcript from the cockpit voice recorder AND associated actions (“not me”) = accurate, then is there the possibility (however faint) of technical failure?
Boeing fuel switches safe, regulator says after Air India crash Air India Crash: Aviation authority says fuel switches are safe
Unfortunately I don’t remember where I saw this but I did read that there had been an issue with the switches generally before, and that Air India had not carried out any remedial actions.
If that’s true, then my theory is that the pilot/co-pilot was manually checking whether the switches were located in the correct position assuming that they may have moved themselves during the take-off.
The BBC link above seems to indicate no safety issue.
“Although the fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models, the FAA does not consider this issue to be an unsafe condition that would warrant an Airworthiness Directive on any Boeing airplane models, including the Model 787,” said the authority, in an internal note shared with the BBC."
Again, I would have expected some “verbalisation” between the 2 pilots had the cut-off switches self-closed. As it is, there would have been a heap of warning messages with a double engine failure that would probably have caused some instantaneous “WTF outbursts” from at least one of the pilots.
i suspect that the full transcript of the audio will be a lot more than outlined in the interim report.
Any emergency checklist is only as good as the circumstances will allow - if both engines rolled back at such a low altitude, there’s no time for “I say old chap, would you mind awfully actioning the double engine failure drill?” The first officer may have on his own volition closed / re-opened the cut-off switches to re-set the engine computer logic (no idea is this is the drill for this type of engine, but it wouldn’t be unusual) with what could have been undemanded engine shutdown?
There are too many ifs, buts, & maybes to even firm up a theory.
The timeline from elsewhere ( + / - one sec as outlined earlier) covers what happened & when.
i have seen this too.
the actions were issued as “advisory” and not “mandatory” and so Air India did not act upon them as there was no requirement to do so
not the source i first saw it, but does back up the above: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/was-advisory-not-mandatory-air-india-on-us-report-on-fuel-control-switch-8864970
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